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Discussion of 
 
“Do Patents Overcompensate Innovators?” by Vincenzio Denicolò 
 
Josef Zweimüller, University of Zurich 
 
 
Vincenzo’s paper addresses the question whether current patents systems compensate 
innovators appropriately. It establishes a simple rule according to which the highest possible 
level of social welfare is obtained when the profit ratio (present value of actual profits relative 
to present value of hypothetical profits under maximum protection) equals the elasticity of the 
R&D output with respect to R&D costs. Patents leading to R&D activities such that this rule 
is satisfied compensate innovators just right.  
 
This is a nice model. It does not only lead to a very simple rule but also integrates nicely more 
general cases and discusses their implications in a meaningful and interesting way. 
Concerning the R&D elasticity, the empirical literature has typically found that estimates of 
the elasticity of the supply of inventions are on the order of 0.5 to 0.7. Concerning the profit 
ratio no such estimates are available but the paper convincingly argues that it is rather 
unlikely that the representative patentee gets more than 50 percent of the profits under 
maximum protection. Patents have a finite duration, the scope is limited and effective life may 
be much shorter than statutory life not least because a patent holder may be displaced by 
future innovators. Hence the paper reaches the punchline that the typical patentee is under-
rewarded and concludes (with caution) that policy reforms should strengthen patents. 
 
 
Figure 1: EPO patent applications, OECD R&D expenditures 
 
Patent applications 
OECD real R&D expenditures 
Source: Harhoff (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have some concerns about this main conclusion. First, that model basically assumes that 
inventions are equal to patents and much of the empirical literature uses patent activity as a 
measure of R&D. Hence both the model and the interpretation of the empirical evidence is 
based on the assumption that patent activity is a meaningful measure for higher R&D output. 
This assumption is certainly questionable. For instance, patent applications in the US have 
grown much stronger than R&D expenditures. Until the mid 1980s there is no trend in US 
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patent application, but since 1985 applications have grown at a rate of 5 % per year. In 
contrast, US R&D expenditures over the same period have grown at an annual rate of only 2.4 
%. Patents have also been increasingly used in Europe in recent decades. Between 1990 and 
2000 the number of patent applications have more than doubled and while real R&D 
expenditures rose by much less than 40 percent.  
 
One could argue that this reflects an increase in R&D productivity but it is unlikely that this is 
the case. The innovative content of patents is hard to measure but there are some indicators 
suggesting that the quality of the average patent has decreased rather than increased.  
 
Figure 2: Quality of EPO patents 
 Source: Harhoff (2005) 
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The middle graph of Figure 2 shows how the number of claims associated with the average 
EPO patent application has evolved over time.1 The fact that the number of claims per patent 
has been increasing does not mean that the scope for a particular patent has become larger but 
that is has become increasingly difficult to ensure appropriate protection for the typical patent 
applicant. The upper graph is more directly – and inversely – related to the quality of the 
typical patent application. It indicates the number of serious objections against the novelty of 
the application found by the technical staff at the EPO in the evaluation process. This 
evaluation involves checking the novelty of the application relative to previous patents, 
publications in scientific journals etc. The graph clearly shows that the above increase in 
claims per application was associated with an increase in the number of serious objections, 
hence with a reduction in the quality of these claims. The lower graph shows that frequency of 
patent challenges. Rule at the EPO include a 9 months period after a patent was granted 
during which third parties can challenge a patent. This procedure has the obvious advantage 
that valuable information of third parties enters the process and provides a mechanism to sort 
out non-novel and obvious inventions. In other words, it helps to avoid that innovators are 
overcompensated (and high litigation costs later on). Between 1980 and 1995, roughly 7-8 
percent of all EPO applications were challenged and about a third of all challenges lead to 
revocation; and another one third of these challenges lead to substantial restriction of the 
scope of the patents. The fact that the fraction of challenges have reduced by 50 percent 
                                                 
1 My discussion here closely follows the one in Harhoff (2005).  
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during the 1990s despite lower quality patents means that is it has become less costly (in 
expected value) to obtain a patent, encouraging lower quality patent applications. 
 
A second problem concerns the interpretation of the empirical evidence. The crucial 
parameter is the elasticity of R&D output with respect to R&D costs but this elasticity is 
notoriously hard to estimate. Many of the previous studies estimating this elasticity have 
relied on patent application data and have generally reached high elasticities. But simply 
equating R&D output with the number of patent applications may be quite misleading. In fact, 
if the innovative content of the typical patent has decreased, estimates based on patent 
application data may seriously overestimate the true elasticity. 
 
If patents are not directly associated with R&D output, there must be reasons other than 
protection of intellectual property (and appropriation of R&D returns) that motivate firms to 
apply for patents. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) study the increase in patent applications in the US 
semiconductor industry. Interestingly, they find that firms do not rely heavily on patents to 
appropriate returns to R&D which strongly suggests that R&D output and patents are only 
weakly associated. They argue that the dramatic increase in US patent applications since the 
mid 1980s has occurred for strategic reasons. The strengthening of U.S. patent rights in the 
1980s has lead to ‘‘patent portfolio races’’. Firm build up such portfolio to increase 
bargaining power in litigation cases and licensing negotiations or to have a credible threat that 
deters competitors to enter a patent litigation. This incentive for strategic patenting is further 
enhanced as many technologies require the use of multiple patents and it is often uncertain 
and/or hard to determine whether a particular process infringes a patent. 
 
The increase in patent applications together with the decreasing average quality in patents is 
consistent with increasing importance of strategic patenting also in Europe. In sum, there are 
good reasons to believe that R&D elasticities which are estimated using data on patent 
applications may be seriously flawed. The decreasing innovative content of patents may 
indicate that R&D elasticities may be seriously overestimated. 
 
A third comment concerns the set up of the model. The model uses a partial equilibrium 
framework to analyze a question that essentially involves general equilibrium considerations. 
While this is common in the literature as no convincing and/or tractable general equilibrium 
model of patents exists this might generate misleading results. The basic model assumes that 
the deadweight losses, consumer surpluses and profits are exogenously given. However, from 
a general equilibrium perspective, these quantities are clearly endogenous. How inputs in 
innovation are (and should be) rewarded will depend on the supply of and the demand for 
ideas, on the imperfections in the R&D (and other) markets, and on how R&D activities 
interact with other activities. Patents policies have to solve the complicated problem of 
aligning the reward to innovators with his/her contribution to social welfare. In modern 
societies in which intellectual property becomes increasingly important, such general 
equilibrium effects are becoming increasingly relevant. While the presented model clearly 
captures very important aspects of reality, a full answer to the question of whether patents 
should become weaker or stronger to ensure an appropriate reward for innovators has to take 
account of such general equilibrium considerations.  
 
A final comment concerns implications for economic policy. Suppose we believe that the 
average innovator is strongly undercompensated. Does this mean we should strengthen patent 
protection? Not necessarily. What matters is not the reward on average, but the reward at the 
margin. Stronger patents might not only induce additional innovations they might also 
increase the demand for strategic patents reducing social welfare. A policy move towards 
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stronger patents needs to be accompanied by improved screening in the application/evaluation 
process, by strengthening third parties who challenge a patent, and by increased sanctions for 
the abuse of the system for opportunistic reasons.  
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